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Abstract
Envisaging how secure systems might be attacked is
difficult without adequate attacker models or relying on
sterotypes. Defamiliarisation removes this need for a priori
domain knowledge and encourages designers to think
critically about system properties otherwise considered
innocuous. However, questions remain about how such an
approach might fit into the larger design process. This
paper illustrates how security requirements were elicited by
building a security chindōgu, and using defamiliarisation
to help analyse it. We summarise this technique before








One of the biggest problems affecting the design of secure
systems is envisaging ways it might be attacked. While a
security engineer may have a sound understanding of
security controls and the broader threat landscape, a
designer’s abstraction of a system does not always match
the abstraction used by an attacker to exploit it. While
user-centered design techniques for building attacker
models [1] provide one solution to this problem, many
practitioners instead resort to stereotyping potential
attackers to glean possible threats. Unfortunately, this
approach leads to a myriad of problems ranging from
unbalanced security due to assumptions about
super-hackers, through to disempowering end-users by
treating them all as potential inside attackers.
Defamiliarisation offers a fresh alternative to these two
options; rather than eliciting or inventing domain
knowledge, defamiliarisation involves divorcing oneself
from the norms and values associated with the domain,
and questioning features that might otherwise have
seemed innocuous. As a creativity technique,
defamiliarisation stimulates new ideas about the nature of
a design problem and its possible solutions. However, to
be an effective innovation technique, defamiliarisation
needs to fit into the larger design process to ensure these
new ideas have impact.
Security chindōgu
Figure 1: Site Authenticationware chindōgu
We have used defamiliarisation to support innovative
security design by analysing security chindōgu. Chindōgu
are gadgets invented to address a particular problem
which, while initially appearing to be an ideal solution,
ultimately introduces so many new problems that it
effectively has no utility [5]. The security chindōgu
technique was first introduced in [2], and motivated by
the belief that requiring engineers to build purposefully
useless artifacts might stimulate creative thinking. To
integrate the use of this technique into a larger design
activity, we devised a process for analysing chindōgu. This
involves using defamiliarisation to inspect the artifact and
eliciting an initial set of its affordances. After reflecting on
the intentional and unintentional possibilities associated
with these affordances, we model both the initial
affordances and their ontological dependencies using the
semiotically-informed ontology charting technique [6].
Where applicable, we annotate the affordances to describe
ambiguities that may lead to unintentional use of the
artifact. Based on these annotations, we specify
requirements to discharge each identified ambiguity.
Security chindōgu in practice
Figure 2: Ontology chart of chindōgu affordances
We used the security chindōgu technique to help develop
a revised information security policy for water treatment
plant staff at a UK water company. The policy updates
we identified were motivated by personas and scenarios we
created; these were grounded in qualitative and contextual
interview data from plant operators at different clean and
waste water works; more information about the study can
be found in [3, 4]. The stimulus for building this chindōgu
arose from two observations made while carrying out
fieldwork. The first was a physical security vulnerability
associated with the wearing of safety clothing. We
observed that wearing safety clothing appeared to afford
unfettered access to much of a particular treatment
works; this was irrespective of whether any form of
personal identification was visible. However, not wearing
this clothing lead to non-wearers being challenged and
their movements restricted for safety reasons. The second
observation arose from reported difficulties highlighted by
one plant operator obtaining out-of-hours technical
support for a control room workstation. Because he had
forgotten his system login credentials, and had no other
form of identification that call-centre support staff would
recognise, he was unable unlock this workstation to
remotely operate some critical hardware. To explore the
externalities associated with satisfying the requirement for
multiple factors of authentication, we examined some of
the paraphernalia associated associated with both plant
operations and information security. This inspired the Site
Authenticationware chindōgu in Figure 1.
Defamiliarisation of the chindōgu took place in an office
setting, and the affordances of the chindōgu were
perceived in a number of ways; these included wearing the
objects and carrying out simple office-based tasks like
typing an email, feeling the textures associated with
surfaces of each item, and generally playing with the
chindōgu in the same way that a young child might. As
each affordance was perceived, an ontology chart was
drawn up of both the initial and subsequent affordances
which appeared to ontologically follow; Figure 2 shows a
transcription of this diagram, together with annotations
made as the diagram was developed. When no more
affordances seemed obvious, security requirements were
elicited to mitigate each of the concerns highlighted. For
example, the identification of the knowledge inscription
affordance raised the question of what might happen if
the surface that the security secret was written on was
damaged or otherwise weakened. To deal with this, a
requirement was specified to state that the medium for
inscribing secrets on a device used for authentication shall
not be modifiable within the device’s warranted contexts
of use.
Lessons learned
When the revised security policy was presented to senior
stakeholders at the UK water company, the reaction to
the chindōgu and its resulting analysis was mixed. The
stakeholders appeared to be captivated by the chindōgu,
and, as such, little attention was paid to the resulting
analysis and requirements. This reaction indicates that,
like other user-centered design artifacts, careful thought
needs to be given to how chindōgu are presented to
ensure the purpose of the artifact is not overshadowed by
the artifact itself. From a security perspective, building
and analysing the chindōgu served two useful purposes.
First, it unintentionally raised awareness of an implicit
vulnerability that had been hitherto overlooked. Second,
the elicitation of several new policy requirements via the
defamiliarisation exercise demonstrated that such
requirements could be elicited without using a priori
security expertise; this challenges general convention
indicating that security experts are needed for security
design. We are currently exploring how this technique,
and defamiliarisation in general, can be used to guide
security design decisions for the EU FP7 webinos project.
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